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NOTE
Oliver v. Raymark: Holding the Line on Punitive Damages
In Oliver v. Raymark Indus. ,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit refused to uphold an award of punitive damages in a
strict products liability case in which the jury had not found compensa-
tory damages to be appropriate. 2 In reversing the district court, the ap-
pellate court rejected the lower court's public policy goals and legal
rationales for permitting punitive damages and held that a finding of
compensatory damages is essential before punitive damages can be
awarded in a strict products liability action under New Jersey law.3 This
reversal is consistent with the current concern that punitive damage
awards have become excessive in frequency and size.4
Part I of this note examines punitive damages and their role in strict
products liability law. Part II looks at the reasoning of both the district
and circuit courts in the Oliver case. This section considers the district
court's arguments for allowing the award of punitive damages without a
corresponding award of compensatory damages in a strict products lia-
bility action, and also investigates the appellate court's narrower focus on
the legal relationship between negligence and strict products liability
causes of action. Part III explores the policy considerations favoring
each of the conflicting views of the district and circuit courts in Oliver and
considers an American Bar Association proposal and three state statutes
which could act as a compromise between the two positions. This section
also considers a hypothetical statute that New Jersey could adopt to deal
with the punitive damage problem in general, and the Oliver case in
particular.
1 799 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'k Oliver v. GAF Corp., No. 83-4208 (E.D. Pa.Jul. 17, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
2 799 F.2d at 97.
3 Id. at 98.
4 See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. See also TORT POLICY WORKING GRoup, AN UP-
DATE ON THE LLABILrrY CRISIS (1987). The Tort Policy Working Group consists of senior officials
from eleven federal agendes. Seven of these officials serve as the chief legal officers in their agency.
The report reviews the recent increase in tort liability and the resulting difficulty that individuals and
institutions have experienced in obtaining liability insurance. In the punitive damages area the re-
port documents the increase in the frequency and size of punitive damage awards and suggests some
possible reform measures. It cites a study of Cook County damage awards which reveals an increase
from $63,000 in 1970-74 to $489,000 in 1980-84 in the average punitive damage award and an
increase from $40,000 to $1,152,174 in personal injury punitive damage awards during the same
period. The report also points out that the number of punitive damage awards in Cook County grew
from three in 1960-64 to seventy-five in 1980-84 and also cites a study of San Francisco damage
awards which reveals an increase in the number of punitive damage awards from 14 in 1960-64 to 51
in 1980-84. Id. at 47-48.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
I. Punitive Damages and Strict Liability
Punitive damages were first awarded almost 4,000 years ago under
the Code of Hammurabi. 5 The American concept of punitive damages
developed under the common law of England.6 These "exemplary"
damages inject the concepts of deterrence and punishment into tort law.
7
These damages, which exceed compensation for the plaintiff's injuries,
are granted to punish the defendant, to teach him not to do it again, and
to deter others from following his conduct.
8
Negligent action alone will not support an award of punitive dam-
ages;9 the defendant's actions must exhibit a conscious and deliberate
disregard for the interests of others which will characterize his conduct as
willful or wanton. 10 When granting punitive damages, courts and juries
focus on the defendant's actions and motives in committing the tort and
not on the particular tort involved."
In the field of products liability, courts and juries have awarded pu-
nitive damages in actions brought under theories of negligence, fraud or
deceit.1 2 However, initially some controversy existed over whether puni-
tive damages could be awarded in a strict products liability cause of ac-
tion for a defective product.' 3 This question became extremely
important as strict liability became a preferred theory of recovery in
products liability litigation.' 4
5 Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 139, 147
(1978).
6 Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel,
14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 353-355 (1983). The article explains that three theories have developed
concerning the emergence of punitive damages under the common law. The first notes that a liti-
gant who had an excessive award of damages assessed against him could not have the appellate court
review the jury award. However, under the Writ of Attaint the litigant could proceed directly against
the jury; if liability was wrongly decided or the damage award was deemed excessive the members of
the jury could be punished. Damages to specifically punish outrageous conduct allowed appellate
courts to accord jury awards a presumption of correctness. This development removed jurors' con-
cerns for their personal liability and promoted the growth of the jury system.
The second theory considers that under the early common law, mental anguish, embarrassment,
and personal indignities were not compensable. It theorizes that punitive damages were awarded so
that the jury could provide compensation for these unrecognized types of personal harm.
Finally, a third theory is based on the fact that the criminal law exacted more severe penalties for
offenses against property than for offenses against one's person. The civil courts may have devel-
oped punitive damages as a means of exacting adequate punishment for personal torts. Id.
7 W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 9 (1971). See also Haugen & Tarkow, Punitive Damages in Minne-
sota: The Common Law and Developments Under Section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes, 11 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REV. 353, 356 (1985) (examining the development of punitive damages under Minnesota law);
Robinson & Kane, supra note 5, at 142 (citing punishment and deterrence as the primary functions of
punitive damages).
8 W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 9.
9 Id. at 10.
10 Id. See also Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problem of Fairness,
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 43 (1983-84) (explaining the conduct necessary for
punitive damages and listing some actions in which they are usually prohibited).
11 W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 11.
12 Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH. L. REV. 1257, 1268 (1976).
Note that "negligence" in this sense means negligence per se, negligence and res ipsa loquitur, or
negligence rising to the level of "willful and wanton" conduct. Id.
13 Id.
14 The widespread acceptance of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts spurred
the increase in popularity of strict liability. Section 402A states:
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In his classic article on the subject, Professor David Owen demon-
strates that strict liability principles are compatible with punitive dam-
ages. 15 First, Professor Owen points out that strict tort liability theory
does not preclude the trier of fact from assessing fault.' 6 Strict liability,
according to Professor Owen, actually extends fault to a faultless manu-
facturer of defective products in a manner similar to negligence per se.1
7
Strict liability was intended to compensate victims, not to limit their
remedies.18
Second, the facts that establish the basis for an award of punitive
damages may differ from the facts that create liability for compensatory
damages. 19 Professor Owen notes that punitive damage claims have long
been permitted in negligence actions despite the fact that establishing
"willful" and "wanton" or "malicious" conduct requires more, and occa-
sionally different proof than is required to establish mere negligence.20
Finally, Professor Owen reasons that awarding punitive damages in
strict products liability actions is proper because such damages have
been held appropriate in a number of cases involving several other strict
liability actions including nuisance, trespass to land, and liability for ul-
tra-hazardous activities, negligence per se, defamation, and implied war-
ranty in the sale of drugs. 21
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). According to FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL IN-
JURY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 103(3) (1982), the following states have explicitly accepted the strict
liability formula of 402A: Florida - West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976);
Georgia - Center Chem. Co., v. Parazini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Idaho - Shields v.
Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Illinois - Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Iowa - Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672
(Iowa 1970); Kentucky - Dealers Transp. Co., Inc., v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.
1966); Maryland - Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Minnesota -
Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg. Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969); Missouri - Kentucky v. Daton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); New Mexico - Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, 429 F.2d
1184 (10th Cir. 1970); Strang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); North Dakota -
Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Oklahoma - Kirkland v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Oregon - Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d
806 (1967); Pennsylvania - Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Rhode Island - Ritter
v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); Tennessee - Ford Motor Co., v.
Lonan, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); Vermont - Zaleskie v.Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d
110 (1975).
15 See Owen, supra note 12. See generally Note, Punitive Damages Awards in Strict Products Liabiliy
Litigation: The Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42 OHIo ST. LJ. 771 (1981) (favoring the use of puni-
tive damages in strict products liability).




20 Id. at 1270.
21 Id. at 1270-71.
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A number of state courts2 2 have embraced Professor Owen's reason-
ing and have allowed the award of punitive damages in strict products
liability actions in order to effectuate the important policy goals of pro-
tecting consumers and promoting responsibility among manufacturers.
New Jersey joined these states in Fischer v. Johns-Manvile Corporation.23 In
Oliver v. GAF Corporation,24 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania correctly predicted that the New Jersey
22 In Fischer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 193 NJ. Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (1984), Judge Pressler
listed the following citations from jurisdictions that have allowed punitive damages in strict products
liability actions:
Alaska - Sturm, Fuger and Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1979), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981) (revolver); Arkansas - Forrest City Mach Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273
Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. Ark. 1981) (grain cart); California - Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981) (automobile fuel
system); Delaware - Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. Del.
1983) (sulfuric acid drain cleaner); Florida - Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d
1108 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1983) (aircraft part); Hawaii - Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (helicopter part); Illinois - Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill.
App. 3d 654, 63 Ill. Dec. 261, 437 N.E.2d 910 (App. Ct. 1982) (asbestos); Indiana -
Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (motorboat); Minnesota -
Gryc v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1980), cert. den. sub nom.,
Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921, 101 S.Ct. 320, 66 L.Ed.2d 149 (1980) (flamma-
ble child's pajamas); Missouri - Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (idle cam); New York - Baleno by Baleno v. Jacuzzi Research, Inc., 93 A.D.2d 982,
461 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 1983) (hydrotherapy unit); Ohio - Moran v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) (asbestos), and Leichtamer v. American Motors
Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (Supp. Ct. 1981) (roll bar onjeep); Oklahoma
- Thiry v. Armstrong World Industries, 661 P.2d 515 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1983) (asbestos);
Oregon - State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268 (Sup. Ct. 1980);
Pennsylvania - Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(asbestos), and Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) (prescription
drug); South Carolina - Campus Sweater & Sportswear v. M.B. Kahn Const., 515 F. Supp.
64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981) (roofing material); Tennes-
see - Johnson v. Husky Industries, Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976) (charcoal grill);
Texas - Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., Inc. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (football helmet); Wisconsin - Wagen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294
N.W.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (fuel tank); Virgin Islands - Acosta v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd.,
717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983) (motorcycle).
193 NJ. Super. at 122-23, 472 A.2d at 582-83. On appeal, Judge Clifford added the following cases
and jurisdictions:
Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp. cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 3339, 90 L.Ed. 2d-
(1986) (Mississippi law); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3335, (1986) (Tennessee law); Hale v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1986) (Missouri law); Hansen v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.
2d 814 (1985) (Texas law); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984);Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied,
467 So. 2d 999, 103 United School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 629
P.2d 196 (1981); cf., Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481
(10th cir. 1984) (Oklahoma law) (in strict products liability suit proof of actual damages is a
prerequisite to punitive damages).
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 NJ. 643, 660, 512 A.2d 466, 475 (1986). The citation of the
final Oklahoma case and the information in parenthesis may indicate that if actually faced with the
situation in Oliver v. Raymark, the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt the appeals court's posi-
tion. See also infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
23 103 NJ. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986). In Fischer, the NewJersey Supreme Court upheld an award
of $86,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages to a plaintiff injured by
exposure to asbestos. Id. at 647-48.
24 No. 83-4208 (E.D. Pa.Jul. 17, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), rev'd sub nom. Oliver v.
Raymark Indus. 799 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Supreme Court would adopt this position.25 However, the district
court's extension of-the punitive damages doctrine to a strict products
liability action in which compensatory damages were not awarded repre-
sented a unique stance that no other court in the nation had adopted.
2 6
II. The Court Opinions: Divergent Views of Punitive Damages in
Strict Products Liability
A. The District Court
In Oliver v. GAF Corporation, Everett and Mildred Oliver brought a
personal injury action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against a group of asbestos manufacturers, alleg-
ing that Everett Oliver contracted asbestosis 27 after being exposed to the
defendants' product. 28 Thejury was given a set of special interrogatories
and found that the defendants had been negligent and had manufactured
a defective product.29 Although the jury found that the asbestos had
proximately caused Everett Oliver's injuries, it did not award him com-
25 Id. at 16-17.
26 The court of appeals pointed out that the Kansas Supreme Court was the only court in the
country that had faced this question. It had decided that an award of actual damages was necessary
in order to receive punitive damages in a strict products liability action. See Lindquist v. Ayerst
Laboratories, Inc., 227 Kan. 308, 607 P.2d 1330 (1980).
27 Asbestosis has been described as:
the earliest known and most common asbestos-related disease ... a latent disease that
manifests itself 10 to 40 years after exposure to significant quantities of asbestos. Inhala-
tion of asbestos fibers initiates a scarring process that destroys air sacs in healthy lung tis-
sue. The result is a decrease in pulmonary function and lung volume. Symptoms associated
with asbestosis include shortness of breath, coughing, chest pains, and clubbing of the fin-
gers. Although the disease is not always fatal, it is progressive and incurable.
Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised By Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND.
L. REv. 573, 579 n.10 (1983).
28 Oliver v. GAF Corp., No. 83-4208, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 1985).
29 The special interrogatory responses that clearly exhibited the jury's finding that the defend-
ants injured Everett Oliver read as follows:
1. Was Everett Oliver, during the course of his employment, exposed to asbestos prod-
ucts supplied by GAF Corporation or the Ruberoid Company? YES
2. If No. 1 is "yes" were such asbestos products defective (unsafe) as of the time they
were supplied by GAF Corporation and the Ruberoid Company? YES
3. Does Everett Oliver have an asbestos-related disease or injury resulting from his occu-
pational exposure to asbestos products? YES
(a) If "yes" did Everett Oliver know, or have reason to know, before April 6, 1981,
that he had an asbestos-related disease or injury resulting from his occupational
exposure to asbestos products? NO
4. If 1, 2, and 3 are answered "yes" and 3(a) is answered "no," was a substantial contrib-
uting factor in bringing about Everett Oliver's asbestos-related disease or injury the
supplying of defective (unsafe) asbestos products by GAF Corporation or the Ruber-
oid Company? YES
5. If No. 4 is answered "yes," at the time that Everett Oliver was exposed to defective
asbestos products supplied by GAF Corporation or the Ruberoid Company, did he
actually know of the danger to which he was exposed and nevertheless voluntarily
assume the risk of disease and injury? NO
6. Was GAF Corporation or the Ruberoid Company negligent as to Everett Oliver by
supplying asbestos products to his place of employment without providing adequate
warnings of the dangers of exposure to such products? YES
(a) If "yes," was such negligence a proximate cause of injury or disease to Everett
Oliver? YES
7. If No. 6 and 6(a) are answered "yes," was Everett Oliver himself negligent, which negli-
gence also was a proximate cause of such disease or injury? NO
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pensatory damages.30 The jury awarded Mildred Oliver $18,234 for loss
of consortium and awarded Everett Oliver $500,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 3' The defendants filed a post-trial motion claiming the award of
punitive damages could not stand without an award of compensatory
damages to Everett Oliver.
32
Because the New Jersey Supreme Court had never addressed the is-
sue of whether a jury could award punitive damages in a strict products
liability action without awarding compensatory damages, the federal dis-
trict court was forced to decide this question without specific guidance
from New Jersey case law precedent.3 3 Judge Van Artsdalen relied on
social policy grounds and legal theory and concluded that a showing of
compensatory damages was not necessary for a jury to award punitive
damages under New Jersey law.34 On a social policy level, the court re-
lied on New Jersey's commitment to the protection of its consumers.3 5
On a legal level, the court maintained that this policy of protecting con-
sumers was furthered if a strict products liability action was treated as an
intentional, rather than a negligent tort for the purpose of awarding pu-
nitive damages.
36
The court noted New Jersey's leading role in the development of
products liability law beginning with the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. ,37 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated the
common law requirement of privity of contract in implied warranty ac-
tions for allegedly defective products. 38 Judge Van Artsdalen believed
that eliminating the requirement of actual damages in a strict products
(a) If "yes," state in percentage the amount of Everett Oliver's causal negligence com-
pared to the causal negligence, if any, of GAF Corporation and the Ruberoid
Company.
GAF Corporation and the Ruberoid Company %
Everett Oliver %
8. In what amount, if any do you award damages to Everett Oliver? $0
9. In what amounts, if any, do you award damages to Mildred Oliver for loss of
consortium? $18,234
10. Do you award any punitive damages? YES
(a) If "yes," in what amount, if any, do you award punitive damages to Everett
Oliver? $500,000
11. Which, if any, of the following listed corporations were also substantial contributing fac-
tors in bringing about Everett Oliver's asbestos-related disease or injury from his occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos products, by reason of such corporations also supplying
defective (unsafe) asbestos products to the place of employment of Everett Oliver: (The
answer to this question merely listed fifteen other corporations the jury believed were re-
sponsible for Everett Oliver's illness or injury).
Id.
30 Id. at 5.
31 Id. at6.
32 Id. at 2.
33 Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the law of the state in which they sit. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This includes the forum state's choice of laws. Klaxon v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The litigants in the trial agreed that NewJersey's substantive
law should control and Judge Van Artsdalen concurred.
34 Oliver, No. 83-4208, slip op. at 12.
35 Id. at 8. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
36 Id. at 9. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
37 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
38 Oliver, No. 83-4208, slip op. at 8.
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liability action3 9 reinforced this long-standing commitment to the con-
sumer.40 He pointed out that:
If, as the court had stated many times, the focus of strict liability is on
the product that is placed into the stream of commerce, defendants
should not be relieved of liability by the fortuitous happenstance that a
plaintiff who suffered some loss, detriment or injury is unable to prove
that he is entitled to compensatory damages. The requirement of ac-
tual damage to sustain a cause of action for strict products liability
does not serve a useful purpose in light of these concerns. 41
The district court also determined that the New Jersey Supreme
Court, if presented with the issue, would consider a strict products liabil-
ity action as being more akin to an intentional tort than to a negligent
tort.4 2 This determination was important because of the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Annsell &
Bonella.43 In Nappe, New Jersey's high court held that an award of com-
pensatory damages was not an essential element of an action for legal
fraud, an intentional tort, and an award of nominal damages would sup-
port an award of punitive damages. 44 Therefore, the district court in Oli-
ver ruled that a finding of compensatory damages was not necessary to
uphold a punitive damages award in a strict products liability action be-
cause the concerns involved were closely related to those in an inten-
tional tort action.
45
Judge Van Artsdalen believed that the principle underlying strict
products liability doctrine supported the rejection of a requirement of
compensatory damages. 46 The judge reasoned that in a strict products
liability action, as in an intentional tort, a plaintiff had had a right vio-
lated and this right should be vindicated through an award of nominal
damages. 47 The judge further stated:
If as the [New Jersey Supreme] Court stated in Nappe, "it is difficult to
justify permitting nominal damages in a trespass action and not in a
39 Id. at 13.
40 Judge Van Artsdalen quoted from a Superior Court of New Jersey decision that stated:
The NewJersey Supreme Court has been in the vanguard of the development of a progres-
sive and responsive products liability law since Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). For the last two decades it has led the country in its ideologi-
cal commitment to the protection of consumers and the concomitant consequence of induc-
ing those who place products into the stream of commerce to act with social responsibility.
See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Sabloff v.
Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 59 NJ. 365, 283 A.2d 321 (1971); Cepeda v. Cumberland Engi-
neering Company, Inc., 76 NJ. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Machine Company, 81 NJ. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.,
87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products, 90 NJ. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1983).
Fischer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 193 NJ. Super. 113, 124, 472 A.2d 577, 583 (1984).
41 Oliver, No. 83-4208, slip op. at 13-14.
42 Id. at 12.
43 97 NJ. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984).
44 Id.
45 Oliver, No. 83-4208, slip op. at 13-14.
46 Id. at 13.
47 Id. Judge Van Artsdalen avoided the lack of an award of nominal damages in Oliver by reason-
ing that where interrogatories showed injury caused by the defendant, the court would infer nominal
damages as a matter of law. Id. at 15.
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case of a willful and malicious intentional tort," then it is even more
difficult to justify not permitting them when the defendant's conduct,
negligent or intentional, is not even at issue in determining liability.
Strict liability attaches irrespective of fault or intent if a defendant
manufactures a defective product that causes injury.
4 8
Judge Van Artsdalen concluded that if special interrogatories estab-
lished that the plaintiff suffered injury due to the defendant's conduct,
the New Jersey Supreme Court would allow an award of nominal dam-
ages if the plaintiff was unable to prove a specific amount of compensa-
tory damages. 49 This award of nominal damages would then be sufficient
in a strict products liability case to support an award of punitive
damages. 50
B. The Third Circuit
In reversingJudge Van Artsdalen's holding, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit directly challenged his interpretation of
the significance of the Nappe case for strict products liability law in New
Jersey.5 1 Judge Hunter, writing for the court, noted that "New Jersey's
adoption of strict products liability eliminated the element of fault
(breach of duty) from a course of action against the manufacturer of a
defective product; it did not eliminate the element of damages." 52 The
court quoted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A: "one who
sells any product in a defective condition . . . is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused."53 According to Judge Hunter, this passage
meant that before punitive damages could be awarded in a strict prod-
ucts liability action, an award of compensatory damages was necessary. 54
Because there was no award of compensatory damages in the Oliver case,
an award of punitive damages was not possible; "[t]here is no separate
tort of 'punitive damages' nor can a plaintiff seek recovery of an exem-
plary award without basing such claim upon an underlying legal theory
or recovery which involved some actual damages."
55
In the absence of any clear guidance from the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the federal appellate court refused to extend the Nappe holding to
a strict products liability action.56 The court believed that the effect of
adopting the lower court's position would extend the law beyond the
point reached by any other court in the nation. 57 This cautious ruling
may appear sensible under the circumstances; however, the circuit
court's failure to address the policy concerns raised by the district court
is troubling. The circuit court narrowly considered the resemblance of
48 Id. at 13.
49 Id. at 14.
50 Id. See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51 799 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1986), rev Oliver v. GAF Corp. No. 83-4208 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 1985)
(LEXIS Genfed library, Dist. file).
52 Id. at 97.
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 98.
55 Id. (quotingJ. GHIRARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE 6.16 (1984)).
56 Id.
57 Id. (quoting W.A. Wright Inc. v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 746 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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strict liability to negligence and used that resemblance to decide the
case.58 The appellate court could have used several policy considera-
tions to support an alternative holding.
III. Policy Considerations Supporting Both Views
There are two major criticisms of awarding punitive damages in a
strict products liability action that the Third Circuit could have used as
grounds for overturning the district court decision in Oliver. The first
criticism centers on the "windfall" theory of punitive damages, while the
second stems from what has been termed the "overkill" doctrine. The
windfall theory suggests that compensatory damages have evolved into a
system of total vindication for injured plaintiffs, covering all the injuries
that punitive damages were meant to address.5 9 According to the wind-
fall theory, punitive damages have become a source of unjust enrichment
for the plaintiff and his lawyer.60 This theory applies directly to the situa-
tion in Oliver. Everett Oliver failed to prove he suffered discernible com-
pensable injury, yet he received an award of $500,000 in punitive
damages. 6' This award certainly appears to constitute a windfall for Mr.
Oliver.
62
However, a recent proposal adopted at the American Bar Associa-
tion Convention in New Orleans could alleviate the windfall problem. 63
This proposal suggests that in tort cases involving multiple judgments
against the same defendant, judges should apportion the punitive dam-
age awards, compensating the plaintiff and his lawyer for bringing the
action and giving the remainder to some "public purpose." 64
58 See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. Professor Sales advances both the windfall and
overkill theories as reasons for banning the use of punitive damages altogether. See Sales, supra note
6. The emphasis on economic issues make them especially useful in analyzing the Oliver case be-
cause accepting the district court's opinion would entitle a large, new class of plaintiffs, those failing
to show compensatory damages, to punitive damages awards.
59 See Sales, supra note 6, at 388. See also K. LEDDEN, PUNrrIvE DAMAGES, § 7.5(E) (1980) (award
of punitive damages leads to overcompensation of the plaintiff); Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence:
The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. LJ. 1, 69 (1985-86). This aspect of
the windfall theory appears to be closely tied to the second theory on the development of punitive
damages (punitive damages were meant to compensate for unrecoverable insults to personal dignity
and mental harm) contained supra note 6. If punitive damages were created to compensate for the
unrecoverable mental anguish and offense to personal dignity aspects of civil cases, then the modem
recognition of recovery of these aspects would make punitive damages obsolete. However, this the-
ory ignores the deterrent and retributive rationales for punitive damages.
60 See Sales, supra note 6, at 388. This theory has a stronger foundation. A punitive damage
award is meant to deter and punish the defendant and express society's outrage at the defendant's
act. The plaintiff is not being compensated for any loss and the award constitutes an unearned
accession of wealth. A solution to this problem is discussed infra notes 64-67 & 81-92 and accompa-
nying text.
61 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
62 While acknowledging that judges normally do not like to speculate about the jury's reasoning
in reaching a decision,Judge Van Artsdalen guessed that the jury had denied compensatory damages
because of testimony that Everett Oliver's forty-year habit of smoking one to two packs of cigarettes
per day aggravated his asbestosis. Oliver v. GAF Corp., No. 83-4208, slip op. at 19 n. 8 (E.D. Pa.
July 17, 1985).
63 Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System, Report No. 123, § C(5)e (1987).
64 Id. The "public purpose" awards mentioned in this report create a method of dealing with
multiple tort claims such as consolidated claims or class actions.
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Under this proposal the plaintiff would receive reimbursement for
bringing the action while society would receive fair compensation for its
injury.65 In Oliver, the ABA proposal would have allowed Judge Van Art-
sdalen to apportion the damages so that Everett Oliver was compensated
for bringing his claim and society was assisted in dealing with the massive
amount of asbestos litigation presently occurring throughout the
country.
66
Unfortunately, while the ABA approach creates a compromise be-
tween Judge Van Artsdalen's concern for the consumer and critics' fears
of punitive damages being a windfall to fortunate plaintiffs,67 it does not
address the second major criticism of awarding punitive damages in a
strict products liability action. This criticism, known as the overkill doc-
trine,68 is inherent in the theory of products liability law. In normal tort
cases, the defendant's allegedly tortious action was directed at a specific
individual and that individual alone may bring the tort claim. However,
in a products liability tort case, the defendant manufacturer's allegedly
defective product may have injured a large, unrelated group of individu-
als, any of whom may bring a claim.69 Each of these individuals may win
a separate judgment against the manufacturer, and the jury may award
each punitive damages. Proponents of the overkill doctrine believe these
multiple punitive damage awards can financially destabilize even the larg-
est product manufacturers. When these damage awards result in bank-
ruptcy, a form of corporate capital punishment has been exacted which
may not be socially desirable or justifiable from a retributive standpoint
and may be totally disproportionate to the degree of corporate
wrongdoing.
70
65 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
66 The New Jersey Supreme Court recently commented on the magnitude of this litigation:
More than 30,000 lawsuits have been filed already for damages caused by that exposure [to
asbestos], with no indication that there are no more victims who will seek redress. Of the
multitude of lawsuits that are faced by asbestos defendants as a group,Johns-Manville alone
has been named in more than 11,000 cases. New claims are stayed because Johns-Manville
is attempting reorganization under federal bankruptcy law.
Fischer, 103 N.J. at 663-64.
67 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
68 This doctrine was first advocated in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d
Cir. 1967). Roginsky involved a negligence action brought by Sydney Roginsky who had developed
cataracts after taking a cholesterol medicine. At trial, the jury awarded Roginsky $100,000 in puni-
tive damages. The appeals court overturned the award because the plaintiff had not shown reckless-
ness, which is required for an award of punitive damages under New York law.
69 Id. at 838-39.
70 Ausness, supra note 59, at 58. For further judicial and scholarly discussion of the overkill
doctrine, see In re School Asbestos Litigation 789 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 182, 107 S. Ct. 318 (1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 526 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231
(10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (no recovery of punitive damages under § 19b of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Globus v. Law Research Service Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d
Cir. 1969) (no recovery of punitive damages under § 17a of the Securities Act of 1933); Sales, supra
note 6, at 398; Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1117, 1141 (1984); Seltzer, supra note 10, at 53; Note, Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp: Extending
Punitive Damages and the Consumer Expectation Test in Products Liability, 11 CAP. U. L. REv. 363, 390
(1981); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797, 1798 (1979); Note,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 919 (1976). For an article
theorizing that the frequency and size of punitive damage awards in mass tort cases may rise to the
level of a violation of the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States (which forbids
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Consequently, under the overkill doctrine, the problem is not to
whom the damages are being paid, but is that they are being paid at all.
71
This problem has become the rallying point for the opponents of puni-
tive damages in products liability cases. 72 Even proponents of punitive
damages in products liability cases have acknowledged the serious prob-
lem that multiple judgments and excessive punitive damages awards in
such cases have created. Professor Owen has stated that, "[1large assess-
ments of punitive damages may not yet be a major threat to the contin-
ued viability of most manufacturing concerns, but the increasing number
and size of such may fairly raise concern for the future stability of Ameri-
can industry." 73 Professor Owen believes that the problems associated
with awarding punitive damages in strict products liability cases can be
reduced by raising the standard for liability and instituting some new
procedural safeguards. 74 Other opponents of punitive damages believe
that they should be completely eradicated from the law of products liabil-
ity in order to protect the continued viability of American industry.
7 5
While the overkill doctrine raises legitimate concerns, it is important
to note the approval of the deterrence element of punitive damages im-
plicit in the Oliver jury's decision. Despite its failure to award compensa-
tory damages, 76 the jury still saw fit to grant punitive damages because of
the wrongful conduct of the asbestos manufacturers.7 7 The importance
of punitive damages as a deterrent must be weighed against the overkill
concerns outlined above, but in the mass tort area this deterrence
message carries a great deal of weight.78 The best way to deliver this
message in the mass tort area would be to implement a plan that would
go beyond the plan proposed by the ABA 79 and directly approach the
problems created by these types of awards.
Three states have taken more direct approaches to dealing with pu-
nitive damage awards. Colorado, Florida and Iowa have each passed
laws requiring that portions of punitive damage awards be paid directly
to the state.
excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment) seeJeffries, A Comment on the Con-
stitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986).
71 See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
72 Note, supra note 15, at 784.
73 Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1982).
74 Id. at 20-59. Professor Owen has suggested that the standard of proof be raised, that the use
of remittitur be increased, that more judgments be decided on the merits, that trials be bifurcated
(jury decides liability and the amount of compensatory damages while the judge decides the amount
of punitive damages), that the plaintiff make a prima facie showing of a manufacturer's liability for
punitive damages before discovery of wealth, and that inflammatory evidence with little probative
value be excluded from trial. Id.
75 See generally Ghirardi & Kircher, Punitive Damage Recovey In Products Liability Cases, 65 MARq. L.
REV. 1 (1981); Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment,
56 S. CAL L. REV. 133 (1982).
76 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
77 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
78 Special Project, supra note 27, at 697-99.
79 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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The Iowa statute creates a two-step process when a punitive damage
claim is asserted in a lawsuit.80 The jury will receive special interrogato-
ries which will first ask them to determine whether the defendant's con-
duct constituted willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of
others."' If this question is answered in the affirmative, the jury may
award punitive damages.
8 2
The second question determines who will receive the punitive dam-
ages and clearly is meant to apply to the mass tort situation. This ques-
tion asks the jury to consider whether the defendant's conduct was
directed specifically toward the plaintiff.8 3 If so, the plaintiff will receive
the full amount of the punitive damage award.8 4 If the conduct was not
specifically directed toward the plaintiff, as would be the case in most
mass tort situations, then the plaintiff may only receive his litigation costs
and fees; this amount is limited to twenty-five percent of the punitive
damage award.8 5 The remainder of the award is paid into a civil repara-
tions trust administered by the state court administrator.8 6 Money paid
into this fund will be supervised by the executive council and wilt be dis-
bursed to fund indigent civil litigation or insurance assistance
programs.8
7
The Florida statute first sets a threshold barrier; the punitive dam-
age award may not exceed three times the amount of the compensatory
damage award for claims based on negligence, strict liability, products
liability, professional liability, or breach of warranty involving willful,
wanton or gross misconduct.8 8 The statute stipulates that plaintiffs will
receive only forty percent of the amount of punitive damages awarded.8 9
If the punitive damages were awarded in a wrongful death action then
the remaining sixty percent will be payable to the Public Medical Assist-
ance Trust Fund which funds health care programs for indigents.90 If the
cause of action is based on another theory of recovery then the sixty per-
cent will be paid into the General Revenue Fund.9 1
The Colorado statute allows a jury to award exemplary damages if
fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct are involved in causing in-
jury. 92 However, the statute limits the exemplary award to an amount
80 IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a)(b) (West Supp. 1987).
81 Id. § 668A.1(1)(a).
82 Id. § 668A.1(2).
83 Id. § 668A.1(1)(b).
84 Id. § 668A.1(2)(a).
85 Id. § 668A.1(2)(b).
86 Id.
87 Id. The Executive Council of Iowa consists of the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Audi-
tor of the State, and the Secretary of Agriculture. The council oversees and distributes funds for
certain state activities. Id. § 19.1-19.23.
88 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768(l)(a) (West Supp. 1987). This statute appears to exclude a plaintiff
who fails to receive compensatory damages and, therefore, exclude Everett Oliver. However, it is
still useful for exploring the concept that punitive damages are meant to reimburse society for the
harm it has suffered and should not be used to compensate plaintiffs.
89 Id. § 768.73(2)(a).
90 Id. § 768.73(2)(b). The Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund was established by Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 409.2662.
91 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b).
92 COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1) (Supp. 1986).
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equal to the actual damages. 93 The statute further provides that one-
third of the exemplary damages will be paid into the state general fund,
while the remaining two-thirds will be paid to the plaintiff.9
4
With these three statutes serving as legislative precedents, New
Jersey could most efficiently handle the Oliver situation by enacting a stat-
ute similar to one of the three discussed above. Iowa's statute would
probably be the best model because it limits the plaintiff's share of the
award to his costs and fees.95 This limitation explicitly recognizes that
93 The limitation is mitigated by the fact that the court is empowered to increase the exemplary
award up to three times the amount of the actual damages award. This increase is permitted if the
defendant continued the behavior or repeated the action, against the plaintiff or others, that created
the cause of action or if the defendant's willful and wanton behavior during the pendency of the
action caused further damage to the plaintiff. Id. § 13-21-102(3).
94 Id.
95 In Fischer, Judge Pressler well summarized the case for imposing punitive damages on asbes-
tos manufacturers:
Johns-Manville, in its answers to interrogatories, which were read to the jury, admitted that
[t]he corporation became aware of the relationship between asbestos and the dis-
ease known as asbestosis among workers involved in mining, milling and manufac-
turing operations and exposed to high levels of virtually 100%o raw asbestos fibers
over long periods of time by the early 1930's. The corporation has followed and
become aware of the general state of the medical art relative to asbestos and its
relationship to disease processes, if any.
In response to plaintiffs' requests for admissions, also read to the jury, it admitted that in
the early 1940's it knew that asbestos "was dangerous to the health" of those industrial
workers who were exposed to excessive amounts of the material. Plaintiffs, moreover, pro-
duced as a witness Dr. Daniel C. Braun, president of the Industrial Health Foundation, a
research organization which develops, accumulates and disseminates information about oc-
cupational diseases. Dr. Braun testified that Johns-Manville has been a member of the
Foundation since 1936. He also testified that since 1937 the Foundation has sent to its
members a monthly digest of articles appearing in scientificjournals which relate to occupa-
tional disease. Relevant portions of the digest, which were admitted into evidence, in-
cluded references to eleven scientific articles published between 1936 and 1941
documenting the grave pulmonary hazards of exposure to asbestos and discussing meas-
ures which could be taken to protect workers. Plaintiffs also proved that as early as 1933
claims were being made against Johns-Manville by asbestos workers, and in November of
that year the Executive Committee of its Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing
the president of the corporation
to enter into negotiations for the settlement of any actions now pending or which
may be hereafter brought against the Corporation by former employees founded
upon alleged injury or disease resulting from their employment by the Corpora-
tion and, in his discretion, to settle any such cases upon such terms as he shall, in
his uncontrolled discretion, deem advisable and for the best interest of the
Corporation.
In December of that year high-level representatives ofJohns-Manville met with officials of
Raybestos-Manhattan, another major asbestos supplier, to discuss steps which the industry
as a whole might take to reduce employee risk. It appears, however, that Johns-Manville
never did arrange for or participate in any industry-wide meetings on the subject. The
minutes of that 1933 meeting also confirm the participants' view that at least for the time
being "our past policy of keeping this matter confidential is to be pursued." Perhaps most
damning of all is the so-called Sumner Simpson correspondence of 1935 and 1941. Simp-
son was president of Raybestos. In October 1935, he received a letter from a Miss Rossiter,
editor of the trade periodical Asbestos suggesting that despite Simpson's earlier requests,
made "for certain obvious reasons," that articles relating to asbestosis not be published,
perhaps the time had come to print a positive article about industry efforts to reduce the
risk in order "to combat some of the rather undesirable publicity given to it (asbestosis) in
current newspapers." Simpson thereupon sent a copy of the letter toJohns-Manville's sec-
retary, Vandiver Brown, expressing his opinion that "the less said about asbestos, the better
off we are." Brown's reply stated in part:
I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by having asbestosis re-
ceive the minimum of publicity. Even if we should eventually decide to raise no
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punitive damages are a form of punishment exacted by society since the
state receives the bulk of the award.
However, NewJersey should be more precise than Iowa in determin-
ing the final destination of the punitive damage awards in the mass tort
area. The law should be drafted so that the punitive damage award
would be used to deal with the harm caused by the defective product that
served as the basis for the underlying action. For instance, in the asbes-
tos area the money could be used to aid those who already suffer from
asbestosis and could also be used to prevent further exposure to
asbestos.
Recent medical literature estimates that almost 265,000 will die from
asbestos-related diseases in the years between 1980 and 2015.96 Unfor-
tunately, more individuals may be added to this number because of the
large number of buildings which were built containing asbestos. 97 The
most tragic victims of the failure to heed the warning concerning the
dangers of asbestos in the 1930's and 1940's are millions of unsuspecting
people who attended the thousands of schools built between 1959 and
1972 that contained asbestos. 98 It will cost billions of dollars to decon-
taminate these schools, but the cost of the distress, anxiety, and physical
suffering caused by years of unsuspecting exposure is incalculable. 99
These two problems could best be addressed by requiring all puni-
tive damage awards in asbestos litigation to be paid to an Asbestos Com-
mission, created by the legislature as a branch of the New Jersey Health
Department. The Commission would dispense funds in two ways. First,
it would direct funds to hospitals in the same fashion as does New
Jersey's Uncompensated Care Trust Fund. This fund requires certain
objection to the publication of an article on asbestosis in the magazine in question,
I think we should warn the editors to use American data on the subject rather than
English. Dr. Lanza has frequently remarked, to me personally and in some of his
papers, that the clinical picture presented in North American localities where there
is an asbestos dust hazard is considerably milder than that reported in England
and South Africa.
Some seven years later, in 1941, Brown wrote to Simpson regarding Miss Rossiter's propo-
sal to include in a forthcoming issue of Asbestos a review of a book apparently linking asbes-
tos exposure with pneumoconiosis. Noting that "a number of her subscribers would dislike
an article on this subject in the trade magazine of the Asbestos Industry," Brown expressed
the view that as a result of his communications with Miss Rossiter, "I am inclined to believe
she will omit any review of the book in question." Finally, plaintiffs' attorney read into
evidence excerpts of the deposition testimony of Kenneth W. Smith, a physician who
started to work for Johns-Manville in 1944 and eventually became Medical Director of its
Canadian corporation. Dr. Smith testified that from the beginning of his employment he
saw persons with asbestosis "on a regular and frequent basis" and frequently made recom-
mendations that such employees receive job reclassifications which would remove them
from continued exposure to asbestos dust.
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 118-20 (App. Div. 1984).
96 Comment, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 739 (1986).
97 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ASBESTOS: REGULATION, REMOVAL AND PROHIBITION 116 (1987)
(quoting BRODUER, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT, 348 (1985)). Environmental Protection Agency
surveys estimate that 31,000 schools and 733,000 federal and commercial buildings have asbestos
containing materials. OFFICE OF Toxic SUBSTANCES, EXPOSURE EVALUATION DIVISION, UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR CONTROLLING ASBESTOS-CONTAINING
MATERIALS IN BUILDINGS, S-i (1985).
98 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 97, at 117.
99 Id.
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New Jersey hospitals to pay into a common fund. Hospitals are then re-
imbursed out of the fund for treating uninsured individuals who cannot
adequately pay their medical bills. 100 This fund helps hospitals located
in less fortunate areas continue to treat the poor in the community.
In a similar fashion, the Asbestos Commission would reimburse hos-
pitals for treating uninsured and underinsured victims of asbestosis and
for participation in research on asbestosis.
The commission could also supply funds to the New Jersey Asbestos
Control Program which oversees asbestos removal, sets standards for
training asbestos workers, performs hazard assessments, and makes rec-
ommendations as to responses to these hazards. 10 The extra funds re-
ceived by the Asbestos Control Program could also be used to research
safer methods of asbestos removal, safer working conditions for asbestos
workers, and proper clean up of work areas.
With its stated purpose of helping society deal with problems cre-
ated by mass tort situations, this statute would also contain a subsection
granting standing to plaintiffs like Everett Oliver. 102 In situations like the
one in Oliver where causation problems prevent a plaintiff from showing
compensatory damages, but the jury still awards punitive damages, this
statute would offer a fair compromise. Everett Oliver would only receive
his litigation costs so there is no windfall problem. 10 3 This statute would
encourage the award of more punitive damages and so would not solve
the overkill problem. However, this statute would be a direct benefit to
society. It would punish the asbestos manufacturers for their behavior'
0 4
while at the same time helping society care for injured citizens like Ever-
ett Oliver.
IV. Conclusion
In Oliver v. Raymark, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit up-
held the prevailing view that punitive damages may only be awarded in a
strict products liability case after the plaintiff has been awarded compen-
satory damages. While this decision appears to be legally sound and has
sufficient social policy arguments to support it, the jury's decision at the
district court level cannot be ignored. Mr. Oliver may have failed to
show injury that could be legally attributed to the asbestos manufactur-
ers, but the jury still found the manufacturers' conduct blameworthy and
punished them through the $500,000 award of punitive damages. It
100 The Uncompensated Care Trust Fund is indirectly funded by third-party purchasers of hospi-
tal care (mainly insurance companies). These third party payors are required to pay ten-percent
more than the normal rate for hospital services. After the money is paid to a hospital, the further
distribution is determined by the number of uninsured individuals the hospital deals with. If the
hospital has a low number of uninsured patients, it will send money to the Trust Fund. If a hospital
has a high number of uninsured patients, then it will receive money from the fund to eliminate the
excess that the ten-percent charge did not cover. Telephone interview with Scott Crawford, Director
of Health Care for the Uninsured, New Jersey Department of Health (Aug' 3, 1987).
101 Telephone interview with Michael F. Lakat, Assistant Coordinator, Asbestos Control Pro-
gram, New Jersey Department of Health (July 31, 1987).
102 For a statute granting standing for private plaintiffs to bring a suit on behalf of "society" and
receive attorneys' fees, see the Air Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
103 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 95.
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would be wise for New Jersey's legislature to pass a law requiring puni-
tive damages to be paid to the state with only a portion going to the
plaintiffs in a mass tort situation. However, the statute should go beyond
the statutes enacted in Colorado, Iowa, and Florida and allow an award
of punitive damages to stand without an award of compensatory damages
when special interrogatories show the manufacturers caused injury to the
plaintiff. Juries should be able to punish blameworthy manufacturers
when wrongful action is brought to their attention, even in a civil trial
where the plaintiff has failed to show compensatory damages. These spe-
cial mass tort punitive damage awards would combine with regular mass
tort punitive damage awards to help compensate both society and the
plaintiff for injury to one of its citizens. Everett Oliver would receive his
litigation expenses and the remainder of his punitive damage award
would go into the Asbestos Commission. The Commission could see
that awards are used by hospitals to care for future victims or by the
Asbestos Control Program to insure that as few people as possible will
suffer Everett Oliver's fate in the future.
Brian M. English
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